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Introduction  
The Russian Federation’s disinformation 
campaign, implemented to justify its 
aggressive policy towards Ukraine, has 
made many analysts, politicians and regular 
citizens aware that the Kremlin has been 
deliberately and cleverly exploiting 
propaganda mechanisms for its own 
purposes. Incidents and occurrences such 
as the Crimean annexation propaganda and 
the war in Donbas have led to the eye-
opening conclusion that the Kremlin’s 
activities are not a return to typical Soviet-
style propaganda. On the contrary, the 
Russian propaganda machine has been 
operating for years. The Kremlin had never 
really decided to drop it entirely, and by 
implementing new methods and tools (such 
as social media), propaganda has evolved 
to a whole new level.   
The Kremlin’s disinformation methods create 
an effective model of geopolitical influence. 
Russian propaganda distorts the perception 
of people, events and even entire institutions 
(the EU, NATO). The results are impressive: 
propaganda has created an alternative 
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version of events at the Euromaidan (the 
seizure of power by fascists), the war in 
Donbas (internal conflict in Ukraine) and 
Syria (Americans supporting ISIS to 
eliminate Bashar al-Assad). This 
disinformation destabilizes the political 
situation in many countries by supporting 
one political faction and simultaneously 
discrediting others. Recent cases included 
the presidential elections in the United 
States and France, as well as the 
parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. 
Similar disinformation campaigns are 
expected for the German parliamentary 
elections later this year.  
The following report describes Russian 
disinformation in the Visegrad countries. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, all formerly part of the Eastern 
Bloc, have all become the targets and 
victims of the Kremlin’s information warfare. 
Putin’s regime exploits various narratives to 
achieve its goals in the Visegrad countries. It 
elicits hatred towards the EU, USA and 
NATO, encourages conflict with bordering 
nations and perpetuates the negative image 
of the “other” (the Roma minority, 
Ukrainians, refugees).  
The text of this policy brief presents the 
main narratives of the Kremlin’s propaganda 
among the Visegrad countries, but first and 
foremost, it reveals important entities 
(people and organizations) that stand behind 
the Kremlin’s narrative in each of the 
respective countries. Although some of them 
may, indeed, be Moscow agents, many 
simply follow the Kremlin’s agenda because 
they actually believe the propaganda that 
they share and/or create. The people, 
political parties, NGOs, paramilitary 
movements and media mentioned in this 
report do not constitute the full list of entities 
that may be considered pro-Russian. In 
many cases, however, they are among the 
most recognizable ones.   
Poland  
In general, the Russian narrative does not 
have a substantial influence on the views of 
mainstream Polish politicians and the media, 
and consequently, on society. More 
specifically, it fails to generate positive 
attitudes toward the Kremlin’s domestic and 
foreign policies, and toward Vladimir Putin in 
particular. It has also failed in convincing 
Poles en masse that Russia is not to be 
blamed for the conflict in Ukraine.  
Due to the fact that Russian propaganda 
cannot make any significant progress in 
improving the image of Putin or Russia 
among Poles, improving the Kremlin’s image 
is not high on Russia’s agenda. Instead, the 
priority lies in introducing and moderating 
topics which, at first glance, might not seem 
to have anything to do with Russia, but 
which ultimately serve to strengthen 
Russia’s position in the region and weaken 
Poland’s by provoking internal arguments 
within society and tensions with neighboring 
countries. Polish-Ukrainian relations are the 
number one topic being exploited as part of 
the general Russian media strategy in 
Poland after the Crimean conflict. Though 
complex, the Russian narrative tries to 
reduce those relations to the level of 
primitive disputes revolving around historical 
guilt and the way that historical differences 
surface today. The Russian narrative also 
attacks Ukrainian migration to Poland, 
threatening Poles with Ukrainians taking 
their jobs and causing wage stagnation. 
Other topics include anti-Americanism, 
criticism of NATO and the EU and 
resentment towards Germany.  
 
Politics 
The pro-Russian narrative in the Polish 
political system is mostly present outside the 
Polish parliament. The most obvious 
example of Russian influence is the work of 
the Change (Zmiana) party. The self-
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proclaimed (on its website) “first non-
American political party” (the Polish court 
has not allowed it to register as a political 
party) was established by Mateusz 
Piskorski, a former member of the Polish 
parliament from the Self-Defence party 
(Samoobrona). Piskorski aligned himself 
closely with the Kremlin’s agenda during the 
Crimean conflict. As he stated in 2014:  
[Ukraine] is a collapsed state. Once the 
West, including Poland, backed 
Bandera’s supporters in Ukraine, the 
country was thrown into chaos […] The 
people of Crimea have been pro-Russian 
for a long time, and they are afraid of the 
Banderists. We should be afraid as well. 
Piskorski became very popular in the 
Russian media and was invited under 
friendly circumstances as a prominent Polish 
politician or political expert to comment on 
events in Ukraine from a “Polish” 
perspective. He also participated in 
monitoring the election in Crimea. In May 
2016, Piskorski was detained by Polish 
prosecutors under the suspicion of spying 
for Russia and possibly China. 
Another figure representing a pro-Russian 
narrative is Janusz Korwin-Mikke, MEP 
and the leader of the Freedom party. In the 
last election, Freedom (at the time known as 
KORWiN) received 4.76% of the vote, only 
0.24% away from entering the Polish 
parliament. Korwin-Mikke, as a member of 
the European Parliament, has libertarian 
economic views and strong anti-EU 
sentiments. He openly claims that his 
mission in the European Parliament is to 
destroy the European Union. When it comes 
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Korwin-Mikke 
supports the annexation of Crimea. He also 
considers Ukraine to be a threat and an 
enemy of Poland, while claiming that 
Russia, “being an enemy of our enemy (i.e., 
Ukraine), is now our ally.” Korwin-Mikke has 
expressed his positive attitude towards Putin 
by claiming that he is a great leader for 
Russia, and even considers Ramzan 
Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic, to 
be a “reasonable person” with liberal 
economic views – which are always 
appreciated in Korwin-Mikke’s political 
environment. He is not considered an agent 
of the Kremlin or a monetary beneficiary of 
Russia, but his political views in many cases 
perfectly reflect Russia’s standpoints.  
 
Organizations and paramilitary 
movements  
The pro-Russian narrative is propagated in 
Poland by organizations that operate on 
many levels to communicate with their 
audiences. The European Center of 
Geopolitical Analysis (ECAG) is a Polish 
think tank that has repeatedly been accused 
of propagating the Russian narrative in 
Poland. The recent “Laundromat” scandal 
revealed that ECAG received €27,685 from 
the UK company Crystalord Limited for 
“consulting services,” proving a direct 
financial link between Russian stakeholders 
(or “dirty money”) and the organization’s 
activity between 2012 and 2014. Members 
of ECAG organized or participated in 
monitoring missions in the unrecognized 
republics of Abkhazia, Ossetia, Transnistria, 
and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in 
Belarus and Syria, countries governed by 
authoritarian regimes. In 2011, ECAG 
members (including Piskorski) visited Libya 
and took part in a propagandist conference 
organized by Muammar Gaddafi. In 2013, 
they went to Syria (on the invitation of the 
Assad regime) to monitor the civil war 
situation in the country. Officially 
representing ECAG, Piskorski gave 
interviews to the Russian media in which he 
attempted to convince the Russian audience 
that the Euromaidan was a provocation by 
Western politicians and NGOs.   
Outside of the mainstream, numerous fringe 
organizations also spread the Russian 
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narrative in Poland. Most of these groups 
are ideologically far-right, though some 
extreme-left groups exist as well.  
Falanga is a Polish organization that took its 
name from the Polish fascist movement that 
existed in Poland before the Second World 
War. Falanga is notable for its anti-NATO 
views, including its stance against deploying 
NATO or US troops in Poland. The head of 
the organization is Bartosz Bekier, who used 
to visit the occupied territories in Donbas 
presenting himself as a journalist who 
strongly supported the separatists. Some of 
his actions include giving a speech at a rally 
in Donetsk back in 2014, in which he 
claimed to represent “free Poles who are 
against the ‘terrorist’ NATO bases in 
Poland.” He protested at the Ukrainian 
embassy in Warsaw surrounded by flags of 
the DNR and the LNR, boasting the slogan 
“Save the people of Novorossiya from the 
Ukrainian army.” Falanga has a quasi-
paralimitary unit with which it organized anti-
Banderist patrols along the Polish border. 
Volunteers from Falanga, dressed like fully 
equipped soldiers, were of particular interest 
to the Russian propaganda machine; their 
patrols were presented on the pro-Kremlin 
NTV channel as an example of Polish fear of 
Ukrainian fascism.  
The Camp of Great Poland (OWP) is 
another organization that references a pre-
war nationalist movement. The organization 
is strongly opposed to mainstream politics 
and is most notable for its anti-Ukrainian 
actions. Dawid Hudziec, a journalist working 
in occupied Donbas for the Novorossia 
Today news blog, was a member of OWP. 
In September of 2015, head of OWP Dawid 
Berezicki was banned by President Petro 
Poroshenko from entering the territory of 
Ukraine, as was Dawid Hudziec. In January 
of 2016, OWP co-organized a propagandist 
trip to Crimea and Moscow.  
The Communist Youth of Poland 
represents the far-left on the spectrum of the 
political scene. Praising not only communist 
Poland, but even Stalinism in the Soviet 
Union, this organization tends to represent a 
fringe ideology that has extremely little 
support among Poles. However, the 
Communist Youth of Poland were also 
among the founding members of the 
Change political party. The only potentially 
noteworthy member of the organization is 
Ludmiła Dobrzyniecka, leader of the group. 
She holds a favorable view of Stalin’s 
dictatorship and sees him as a great leader. 
Most importantly, Dobrzyniecka has left 
Poland to fight in Donbas on the side of pro-
Russian separatists in the Luhansk People's 
Republic. She is currently a member of the 
Interunit international brigade.  
 
Media 
Facebook and other designated websites 
are the main channels used to reach the 
Polish audience. Usually, the media that 
support the Russian narrative devote 
considerable attention and space to articles 
related to Ukraine. Other issues are 
exploited to a lesser extent, but are still 
covered in order to make sure that the 
reader notices that the authors contest 
liberalism and the modern-day world order in 
general.  
The most high-profile website considered to 
present the Russian narrative is Kresy.pl, 
which displays strong anti-Ukrainian 
attitudes based on historic resentment. 
Another openly pro-Russian page is 
Xportal, established by Bartosz Bekier, who 
is also a leader of far-right Falanga. 
Novorossiya Today, Tragedy of Donbas 
(both websites) and Fighting Novorossiya 
(a Facebook page) are some other fringe 
media outlets fueled by Russian 
propaganda. All of them are edited by Dawid 
Hudziec, affiliate of the Camp of Great 
Poland, who now works as a journalist in 
occupied Donbas. Another interesting 
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example is Tomasz Maciejczuk, who 
underwent a conversion from “pro-Ukrainian 
journalist” to “Ukrainian fascist hunter.”  
Some time ago, he announced his new post 
as a regular contributor to the Russian 
television channel Rossiya 24. 
 
Czech Republic  
The Czech Republic’s official position does 
not differ from the political mainstream 
regarding views on the war in Ukraine or 
Russia’s influence on the conflict in Donbas. 
After the annexation of Crimea, Czech 
deputies issued a statement condemning 
the decision of the authorities of the Russian 
Federation. In a resolution approved by 121 
deputies, the annexation was recognized as 
an act of violence against Ukraine. 
Additionally, the Czech Republic officially 
supports the EU’s sanction policies towards 
Russia. 
However, the status of Russian influence in 
the Czech Republic remains very peculiar. 
The pro-Russian narrative maintains 
representation on various levels of politics 
and the media, from mainstream 
organizations to fringe ones. The Russian 
narrative is spread by a small, yet loud and 
visible minority. The most recognizable pro-
Kremlin influencer in the Czech Republic is 
Miloš Zeman, president of the country. His 
stance on Russia, characterized mostly by 
his expressing “understanding” of the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy, is backed by 
political parties (mainstream and fringe) and 
various media outlets.   
 
Politics 
Miloš Zeman, president of the Czech 
Republic, is considered a pro-Russian 
agenda setter in the Czech political 
mainstream. His notorious pro-Kremlin 
statements include claims that Crimea 
cannot be returned to Ukraine and that 
Arseniy Yatseniyk, former prime minister of 
Ukraine, was a “prime minister of war.” In 
2015, Zeman was the only EU president 
who visited Moscow to commemorate the 
anniversary of the end of the Second World 
War.  
Zeman’s views are echoed and amplified in 
the Czech parliament by the Freedom and 
Direct Democracy party (Svoboda a přímá 
demokracie, SPD). In many respects, SPD 
is a textbook example of a Eurosceptic 
party. SPD tried to call a referendum to 
withdraw the Czech Republic from the EU 
but failed to receive support for it in the 
Czech parliament. The party leader, Tomio 
Okamura, has a much more positive stance 
towards Russian than towards the EU or 
NATO. Regarding the war in Ukraine, he 
consistently denies Russia’s involvement in 
the conflict – in fact, Okamura sees the 
conflict as a civil war provoked by the USA 
and the EU. Consistent with their political 
views Okamura and SPD disapprove of the 
sanctions imposed on Russia.  
Beyond the mainstream, the Kremlin’s 
narrative is also represented by the far-right 
National Democracy party (Národní 
demokracie, ND). This party presents not 
only pro-Kremlin views, but also strong anti-
Semitism. When Russia annexed Crimea in 
March 2014, ND decided to send a letter to 
the Russian Embassy in the Czech 
Republic. The letter expressed support for 
Vladimir Putin and his policies and 
welcomed Russia’s efforts in the interest of 
ensuring order and stability in Ukraine. Later 
the same year, the deputy chairman of ND 
visited Donbas under occupation in order to 
take part in an electoral observation mission 
and was subsequently declared a persona 
non grata by the Ukrainian authorities.  
 
Organizations and paramilitary 
movements  
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Pro-Russian political activities are supported 
through the work of various non-
governmental organizations. Arguably, the 
most recognizable example is the 
“Consulate” of the Donetsk People’s 
Republic that opened in the Czech Republic 
in September 2016. Since Prague does not 
officially recognize the DNR, the “Consulate” 
is in fact a Czech NGO. Nela Liskova, who 
has connections with the Freedom and 
Direct Democracy party, is the head of the 
NGO and a self-described “honorary consul” 
of the DNR in the Czech Republic.  
The Institute of Slavic Strategic Studies is 
a Czech NGO that identifies strongly with 
the Pan-Slavic movement. The Institute 
mostly promotes pro-Russian opinions, 
while criticizing the EU and the US. Articles 
published by the organization claim that the 
Americans are threatening Russia with 
terrorist attacks, that the real terrorists are 
European and Czech governors, and that 
the US is responsible for the terrorist attacks 
in France. Some events of the Institute have 
been co-organized by the Freedom and 
Direct Democracy party.  
The Czech-Moravian Slavic Association 
represents a peculiar mutation of 
communist-nationalist ideology. As with the 
previous group, the main ideology that 
stands behind the organization is Pan-
Slavism. The organization supports Kremlin 
policy because it is considered to be pro-
Slavic, while the Ukrainian government 
represents anti-Slavic resentment. The 
Czech-Moravian Slavic Association 
cooperates with the Institute of Slavic 
Strategic Studies. 
There are also paramilitary groups in the 
Czech Republic that promote the Russian 
narrative. Czechoslovak Soldiers in 
Reserves (Českoslovenští vojáci v 
záloze, CSR) opposes the policies of the 
Slovak and Czech authorities, who are 
deemed to be servants to the EU and USA. 
CSR believes that NATO is preparing for 
war against Russia. It also objects to all 
attempts to blame Russia for the situation in 
Ukraine and labels the current Ukrainian 
government as fascist and illegal. Another 
paramilitary organization is the National 
Home Guard (Národní domobrana), 
established in affiliation with the National 
Democracy party. Nela Liskova, self-
proclaimed “honorary consul” of DNR in the 
Czech Republic is a member of the National 
Home Guard.  
 
Media  
The Russian narrative is featured mainly on 
social media and in other areas of the 
internet. It focuses primarily on attacking the 
EU, NATO, the US or Ukraine, while to a 
lesser extent also promoting a positive 
image of Russia. The main propagators of 
the Kremlin’s narrative are Our Media, 
which runs several disinformation projects, 
including the Parliamentary Sheets 
(Parlamentní listy) website; AC24.cz, 
which promotes the Kremlin's point of view 
on international events, often referencing 
non-existent documents or reports from the 
Russian Ministry of Defense or other official 
bodies; and Sputnik Czech Republic.  
 
Slovakia  
Slovakia appears to be one of the prime 
targets of Russian influence. Based on 
“Pan-Slavic” resentment, which has found 
fertile ground in Slovakia, the Kremlin 
narrative has influenced a considerable 
number of entities, including a political party 
represented in the parliament and 
recognized media. Among the Central 
European countries, the Slovakian 
government is considered “dovish” with 
regard to the level of its criticism of Russia 
for annexation of Crimea and its 
engagement in the war in Donbas, as 
opposed to the “hawkish” Baltic States and 
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Poland. Prime Minister Robert Fico has 
been one of the most outspoken critics of 
the sanctions that were imposed on Russia 
back in 2014. Yet, when it comes to practical 
policymaking, the Slovakian government 
adheres to the European mainstream, 
whose official policy is to keep sanctions 
and support the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine. The success of the Kremlin 
narrative in Slovakia is, however, 
undeniable, with an openly anti-Western and 
pro-Russian political party currently holding 
seats in the parliament and the country 
witnessing a tremendous growth in 
paramilitary movements inclined towards the 
Kremlin’s world view.  
 
Politics   
The Kremlin has found a perfect partner for 
furthering its narrative in Slovakia in the far-
right People’s Party our Slovakia (L’SNS). 
Led by Marian Kotleba, a former school 
teacher and governor of Banska Bystryca, 
L’SNS has been present in the Slovakian 
parliament since 2016, when it won 8% of 
the popular vote. The popularity of the party 
raises serious concern among the Slovakian 
elite, as well as among many regular 
Slovaks, who see the party as a neo-fascist 
movement. The opponents of L’SNS have 
plenty of evidence to support this view. 
Marian Kotleba himself praises Josef Tiso 
and the First Slovak Republic. Among the 
L’SNS membership, one can find people 
who have praised Adolf Hitler and Nazism, 
Holocaust deniers and people who have 
been investigated and prosecuted for 
criminal offences motivated by racial hatred, 
especially against the Roma minority.  
L’SNS’s anti-Western attitude is crystal 
clear. Kotleba and other members of the 
party see the European Union and NATO as 
threats to national sovereignty. Members of 
the party spout strong criticism of these 
institutions on a regular basis – this was also 
part of the party’s political campaign for the 
2016 national parliamentary elections. 
During the campaign, L’SNS published their 
program – Ten points for our Slovakia. The 
program called NATO a “criminal pact which 
serves to promote the power interests of the 
USA” and called for ending cooperation with 
the West and instead introducing a balanced 
cooperation with all the countries of the 
world.  
The leaders of L’SNS are known for 
presenting opinions that are similar to views 
popular in Kremlin circles. In January 2014, 
Marian Kotleba, then acting governor of 
Banska Bystryca, sent a letter to Viktor 
Yanukovych backing his actions during the 
Euromajdan. He called the protesters 
“terrorists” and said the real reason behind 
the conflict is the EU’s greed for new 
markets and NATO’s pushing its military 
closer to the border of the Russian 
Federation.    
This hatred of the EU and NATO was 
reiterated once more in October 2016, when 
L’SNS organized signature collections for a 
referendum to withdraw Slovakia from the 
EU and NATO.  
The extremist policy of L’SNS has been 
recently addressed by the Prosecutor 
General, who asked the Slovakian Supreme 
Court to ban the party, accusing it of 
infringement of the constitution and trying to 
destroy the country’s democratic system.  
 
Organizations and paramilitary 
movements 
The strong position of paramilitary 
movements is evident in Slovakia. They 
represent a wide spectrum of political views, 
with some leaning toward right-wing 
positions and others toward the left side of 
the political scene. There is, however, one 
thing that unifies them – strong connections 
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with Russia, represented by ideological 
connections, personal connections or both.  
Slovak Conscripts (Slovenskí branci – 
SB) is a paramilitary movement established 
in 2012 along the lines of the image and 
standards of Russian military-patriotic clubs. 
The organization was launched by Slovak 
students who had participated in paramilitary 
courses in Russia and decided to mirror 
their Russian training in their home country. 
The SB network has been growing fairly 
quickly – at the end of 2016, they already 
had 17 territorial units with approximately 
150 members.  
The organization considers itself apolitical, 
but is usually associated with an “anti-
fascist” stance. They perceive the Second 
World War as a historical struggle against 
fascism and Nazism and distance 
themselves from wartime Slovakia and Josef 
Tiso. Yet, the organization has been 
showing strong inclinations towards the 
“Pan-Slavic” idea, which can be seen mostly 
in its negative attitude towards NATO and 
the USA, and to a lesser extent in its 
attitudes towards the EU. SB’s “Pan-
Slavism” is often in line with Russian 
interests. One of its members went to 
Donbas to fight on the side of the pro-
Russian separatists, while another travelled 
to Russia to participate in trainings 
conducted by Russian Cossacks. Its 
members are known for statements refusing 
to acknowledge the Russian military’s 
presence in Ukraine or denying that Russia 
illegally annexed Crimea.   
Action Group Resistance Kysuce (Akčná 
skupina Vzdor Kysuce – VK) is a far-right 
paramilitary movement that glorifies Josef 
Tiso and espouses radical anti-Semitism. It 
claims to follow in the legacy of Slovakia’s 
war-time army that fought alongside the 
Wehrmacht “against Bolshevism.” The 
movement has connections with the L’SNS 
political party. The leader of VK ran an 
unsuccessful campaign for parliament on 
L’SNS’s list. VK strongly disapproves of 
current Slovak-Russian relations. The group 
has called upon its supporters to take active 
measures – including infiltrating the army 
and politics and even using weapons 
against incumbent politicians – to change 
national policy and prevent Slovak-Russian 
tensions, which they say have a catastrophic 
influence on Slovakia.  
Slovak Soldiers’ Association (Asociácia 
slovenských vojakov – ASV) is a civilian-
military organization established in 1991. 
After a number of years “in limbo,” it was 
relaunched in 2015. The organization has 
attracted mainly retired Slovak officers and 
has been quickly recognized as an 
institution that is critical of NATO. 
ASV believes the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization is increasingly becoming a tool 
for the American and European elites’ 
aggression in the fight for redistribution of 
resources, not for the defense of democracy 
(which they deem is already an essentially 
“dead ideology”). The group is also a 
proponent of Russian interests in the region, 
recently accusing the Slovak Ministry of 
Defense of cooperating with NGOs that 
“conduct mostly one-sided lobbying in favor 
of NATO’s military campaign against the 
Russian Federation and for the benefit of the 
military-industrial complex of the United 
States.” 
 
Media 
The openly pro-Russian camp on Slovakia’s 
media landscape consists of several, mostly 
fringe, media outlets. Earth and Age (Zem a 
Vek) is a monthly conspiratorial periodical 
that promotes anti-Western, anti-EU and 
anti-NATO views and has been openly 
supporting the rebellion in Donbas. 
HlavneSpravy.sk is a web portal that mixes 
fake news coming from Russia with reliable 
information from the mainstream media. In 
2016, the two entities mentioned above 
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formed the Association of Independent 
Media in cooperation with Free 
Broadcaster (Slobodný vysielač), an 
online radio channel which is also 
considered a source of anti-Western and 
pro-Russian rhetoric. Other outlets 
considered to be spreading the Kremlin’s 
narrative are the bi-weeklies Literary 
Weekly (Literárny týždenník) and Warrior 
(Bojovník) and the monthly Extra Plus.   
 
Hungary 
Unlike the other Visegrad countries, 
Hungary lacks linguistic and cultural 
connections with Russia. Nor can it refer to 
Pan-Slavic ideology. Economic pragmatism, 
derived from energy dependency, has for 
many years been the driving force behind 
Hungary’s policy vis-à-vis Russia. For the 
last few years, however, Hungary has been 
witnessing an eastward turn in its overall 
politics, which is revealed in the Hungarian 
version of illiberal democracy, a 
phenomenon that derives many of its 
features from the Kremlin’s formula of 
governing the state. The country is 
susceptible to the Russian narrative, which 
in Hungary is based on questioning 
Hungary’s membership in the EU and NATO 
and arousing resentments towards 
Transylvania and Transcarpathia with the 
aim to open territorial disputes with Ukraine 
and Romania.  
 
Politics 
Many point out Fidesz, the Hungarian ruling 
party, when discussing the strengthening of 
ties between Hungary and Russia. Prime 
minister Victor Orban and his aides have 
been criticized for implementing Kremlin-
style policies in Hungary, for instance, with 
regard to NGOs.  In 2014, Orban gave a 
speech in which he declared that he wants 
to build an “illiberal democracy” in Hungary. 
The most disturbing example of mainstream 
political force being responsible for 
promoting the Kremlin’s interests in Hungary 
is, however, the far-right Jobbik – 
Movement for a Better Hungary. Jobbik is 
part of a network of far-right parties in 
Europe that support Russian geopolitical 
goals by echoing the Kremlin’s “mindset” 
and its attempts to destabilize NATO and 
the EU. For years, Jobbik had not been 
worried about the movement’s aggressive 
and nationalistic image. In 2013/2014, 
however, the party decided to change its 
strategy and has been undergoing a general 
facelift, shifting closer to the political center 
in the hope of attracting new voters. Despite 
trying to shed its negative image in the 
mainstream, Jobbik has not severed its 
connections with the right-wing radical 
scene of Hungarian politics. Although the 
party has made great efforts to distance 
itself from extremist movements, any real 
changes have been superficial, applied first 
and foremost to satisfy and mislead the 
general public. In reality, Jobbik remains 
intertwined with the extremist and 
paramilitary organizations that have become 
even more important in channeling the 
Kremlin’s narrative in Hungary. 
 
Organizations and paramilitary 
movements 
There is an abundance of far-right extremist 
organizations that either deliberately or 
unintentionally push the Russian agenda in 
Hungary. What is common to all of these 
organizations is their extreme negative 
perceptions of the Roma minority and 
migrants coming to Hungary due to the 
refugee crisis. They display negative 
attitudes towards the European Union and 
NATO and frequently include a policy of 
border revisionism as part of their political 
agenda.   
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The Sixty-Four Counties Youth 
Movement (HVIM) is a revisionist, hate-
fueled organization whose goal is the 
restoration of Great Hungary. Its anti-Semitic 
and anti-Roma attitude is widely known. 
Facebook has even banned the pages of all 
groups affiliated with the organization, 
apparently for their use of Nazi symbols. 
The group has on multiple occasions 
questioned the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
In 2014, HVIM co-organized (with Jobbik) 
protests in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in 
Budapest to demand autonomy for 
Transcarpathia and has opted for the 
federalization of Ukraine. The same year, 
HVIM organized protests calling for a 
“patriotic stand in support of Russia.”  
The Army of Outlaws is another extremist 
organization that cooperates closely with 
HVIM. Both were established by Laszlo 
Toroczkai, the current Mayor of the city of 
Ásotthalom. He is also a vice president in 
Jobbik. The Army of Outlaws openly uses 
violence, especially against the Roma 
minority, and obtains a part of its revenue 
from “protecting” other organizations. The 
organization is very susceptible to Russian 
propaganda and even uses its own channels 
to spread it, including the Facebook profiles 
of its members. On its website, one can read 
a field report by one of its members about a 
visit to Russia that describes the country as 
a model of law and order and normalcy, as 
opposed to the West, infected by liberal 
values. The group sees Russia’s 
interventions in Ukraine and Syria as 
legitimate and describes Putin’s regime as a 
guarantor of peace and orderliness. 
The paramilitary New Hungarian Guard 
Movement (MÖM) is another unofficial 
acolyte of Jobbik. The organization is mostly 
active as an anti-refugee movement, which 
promotes the view that the migration crisis in 
Hungary and Europe was organized with US 
funding.   
The Hungarian Self-Defense Movement, a 
sister organization of Jobbik, tries to depict 
itself as a group that is open to society, one 
which organizes donation drives and assists 
in flood prevention and community care 
projects. In reality, the organization is yet 
another example of an extreme-right 
movement, dangerous primarily due to its 
military-type training, which is offered by the 
“self-defense chapter” of the group, as well 
as the constant threat it poses to the Roma 
minority. They also regularly conduct anti-
migrant events together with Jobbik.  
 
Media  
Extremist organizations operate mostly 
through the social media, websites and 
occasional interviews. Their peculiar views 
find little understanding in the mainstream 
media and their views on Russian rarely 
reach the general public. When they occur, it 
is mostly through “scandals,” such as in 
2015, when the extreme-right Ukrainian 
paramilitary organization Karpatska Sich 
threatened to annihilate Jobbik and HVIM 
activists they saw as undermining the 
Ukrainian state and destabilizing the region, 
or in 2016, when the leader of the pro-
Russian Hungarian National Front (the 
organization was afterwards dissolved) killed 
a police officer when his house was 
searched for weapons.  
The pro-Kremlin narrative’s presence in the 
mainstream is mostly thanks to the presence 
of Jobbik in the political mainstream. 
Jobbik’s connections with Russia are both 
apparent and controversial. Probably the 
most “spectacular” cooperation was 
revealed in 2014, and involved Bela Kovacs, 
a Hungarian Member of the European 
Parliament and the former head of Jobbik’s 
policy cabinet. Kovacs was accused by the 
authorities of espionage against the EU on 
behalf of Russia. The accusation was not 
followed by any concrete measures, 
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however, and Kovacs has remained 
politically active in Brussels. 
 
Conclusions  
The Kremlin’s narrative in the Visegrad 
countries is promulgated through different 
entities and exploits a variety of topics to 
achieve its strategic goals. Although the pro-
Russian narrative is generally shared 
(intentionally or unintentionally) by fringe 
media outlets, it also counts adherents 
among the mainstream political parties and 
even the most prominent politicians. Jobbik 
in Hungary, the Freedom and Direct Party in 
the Czech Republic and the People’s Party 
our Slovakia all hold seats in national 
parliaments and put forward agendas that 
oppose western values and question 
membership in the EU and NATO. At the 
same time, their political views are often in 
favor of the Kremlin’s interests. In the case 
of the Czech Republic, even the president 
has on many occasions echoed the Russian 
narrative.  
While some topics are commonly exploited 
by Russian propaganda in the Visegrad 
countries, others are country specific. The 
anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-US agenda is a 
common denominator for the Kremlin’s 
narrative in the V4, as is the disinformation 
campaign about refugees invading Europe. 
As complicated as the situation with the 
refugee crisis is, the propaganda tries to 
depict migration as a serious threat to both 
national security and traditional European 
values. In Poland, the Kremlin’s narrative of 
disinformation concentrates heavily on 
disturbing Polish-Ukrainian relations by 
provoking disagreements over history and 
frightening Poles with visions of massive 
migration from Ukraine that may be harmful 
for the Polish job market. In Hungary, it 
revives resentment towards “Great Hungary” 
and incites questioning the territorial integrity 
of Ukraine and Romania. In the Czech 
Republic, and especially in Slovakia, Pan-
Slavic ideology has been revisited, with 
Russia as the center of the Pan-Slavic 
world, and contemporary Ukraine and the 
West as its main enemies.  
Combating the Russian narrative in the 
Visegrad countries has been sluggish. 
Although the Ministry of Interior in the Czech 
Republic launched the Centre against 
Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, actions 
undertaken in the Visegrad countries are 
insufficient and ineffective. The analytical 
community has been slowly, but 
consistently, gaining knowledge about the 
Russian narrative in the respective Visegrad 
countries. Now is the time to take a new 
approach and develop sustainable (not 
occasional) national and multinational 
cooperation, with the inclusion of people 
from European institutions.   
The first step is to stop ignoring the potential 
threat of disinformation. Politicians have to 
speak about it openly and condemn the 
meddling of Kremlin propaganda in national 
politics. A great example has already been 
set by President Emmanuel Macron during 
his meeting with President Putin in May 
2017. Talking to journalists, Macron heavily 
criticized Russia Today and Sputnik for 
spreading lies during the French presidential 
campaign1.  
Apart from words, concrete actions are also 
necessary. The financial links of 
organizations and media outlets that lobby 
the Kremlin’s narrative should be 
scrutinized. Information revealed in recent 
months shows that Russian capital was 
used to finance anti-Ukraine and pro-
separatist protests in Poland and other 
                                               
1 Macron, Standing Alongside Putin, Says 
Russian Media Spread 'Falsehoods, “The 
Atlantic”, 30 May 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/0
5/macron-rt-supnik-are-agents-of-
influence/528480/. 
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countries, mostly in 2014 and 20152. This 
situation demands a proper investigation by 
national security forces, as well as by 
investigative journalists and constant 
monitoring by the analytical community.  
Finally, the countries of the European Union 
should develop deeper cooperation among 
their secret service units to deal with 
Russian disinformation. Only effective 
cooperation in this area can help bring about 
the early detection and neutralization of 
these potential threats to national security.   
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